The virtues of dissoi logoi by Ferry, Victor
University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 10
May 22nd, 9:00 AM - May 25th, 5:00 PM
The virtues of dissoi logoi
Victor Ferry
Université Libre de Bruxelles, Research Group in Rhetoric and Linguistic Argumentation (GRAL)
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been
accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please
contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.
Ferry, Victor, "The virtues of dissoi logoi" (2013). OSSA Conference Archive. 46.
http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA10/papersandcommentaries/46
Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario 
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-8. 
The virtues of dissoi logoi  
 
VICTOR FERRY 
 
Research Group in Rhetoric and Linguistic Argumentation (GRAL) 
Université Libre de Bruxelles 
CP175, avenue F.D. Roosevelt 50, 1050 Bruxelles 
Belgium 
vferry@ulb.ac.be  
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: My claim is that rhetorical training is required to develop citizenship skills. I illustrate 
this claim by focussing on dissociation of notions, that is, a rhetorical technique that citizens might 
have to use in their civic life. After distinguishing a rhetorical and a normative approach to 
dissociation, I argue that dissoi logoi, as an exercise invented by the Sophists, offer a relevant training 
to master this technique. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
According to Daniel Cohen (2009) “keeping an open mind” and “having a sense of 
proportion” are virtues an arguer should have in order to maximize “cognitive gain 
to be had from arguing”. In addition, such virtues would “help to bring an argument 
to successful closure”. Andrew Aberdein (2010) argued for a much more detailed 
list of virtues in association with goals one should pursue when arguing. For 
instance, the “willingness to engage in communication” requires a virtue such as 
“being communicative” or the “willingness to listen to the others” could be better 
implemented with a virtue such as “intellectual empathy”. It appears that the 
method used by Cohen and Aberdein to identify such virtues is to speculate on 
ideals of argumentative situations. Their inquiry leads to naming virtues that no one 
would consider as harmful for discussion. Indeed, no one would reasonably argue 
that “open mindedness”, “sense of proportion”, “being communicative” or 
“intellectual empathy” would have a bad effect on argumentation. However, when 
we focus on uses of argumentative techniques, the issue of the virtues of 
argumentation becomes more controversial. In this paper, I will focus on the 
technique of dissociation of notions and distinguish two approaches to this 
technique: the rhetorical and the normative. 
In a first part, I will present the concept of dissociation as described by 
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969 [1958). Their theoretical framework has to do 
with an Aristotelian conception of rhetoric, which is nowadays notably supported 
by Danblon (2002), Garsten (2006) and Tindale (2006). I will then illustrate the 
functioning of this technique by analysing the dissociation on the notion of “war” 
that was performed by Barack Obama when receiving his Nobel Peace Prize. 
VICTOR FERRY 
2 
In a second part, I will present the normative conception of dissociation. The 
roots of this approach can be found in Stevenson’s article on Persuasive Definitions 
(1938). More recently, Agnes van Rees (2009) dedicated a comprehensive book to 
dissociation from a normative approach. Rather than revealing an opposition on 
virtues, the comparison between Perelman’s approach to dissociation and the 
normative one will reveal different hierarchies of priorities about the virtues an 
arguer should have in order to successfully perform this technique.  
In a third part, I will argue that the rhetorical approach is, in this respect, 
more realistic. To support my claim, I will show, in line with Dupréel (1948), Pearce 
(1994) and Danblon (2013), that dissoi logoi, as an exercise used by the sophists in 
their training, might be a required step to the mastery of the technique of 
dissociation. 
 
2. THE CONCEPT OF DISSOCIATION 
 
According to Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca the origin of dissociation is the need to 
solve a practical problem:  
 
[dissociation of notions is always prompted by the desire to remove an 
incompatibility arising out of the confrontation of one proposition with others, 
whether one is dealing with norms, facts or truth (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
1969 [1958], p. 413).  
 
This practical problem can often be described as a perverse incentive (Danblon, 
2013, p. 144), that is, the feeling that one is doing wrong while trying to do right. For 
instance, the need for a judge to dissociate between the letter and the spirit of the 
law originates in the feeling that the strict implementation of the law would be 
unjust in a given case. 
To solve this practical problem, the arguer will initiate a semantic work on 
the meaning of a notion. The result will be a dissociation between some aspects of it 
that will be negatively valued and some others that will be positively valued :  
 
While the original status of what is presented as the starting point of the 
dissociation is unclear and undetermined, the dissociation into terms I and II will 
attach value to the aspects that correspond to term II and will lower the value of the 
aspects that are in opposition to it. Term I, appearance in the strict sense of the 
word, is merely illusion and error. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969 [1958], p. 
417) 
 
In this quote, it is worth stressing on the idea that prior to the dissociation, the 
notion is “unclear and undetermined”. Indeed, it is probably on the conception of 
clarity that the difference between Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca approach to 
dissociation and the normative approach to this technique is the most obvious. 
Following Danblon (2002, pp. 120-125) I would argue that one should have in mind 
Perelman’s conception of “confused notions” (Perelman, 2012 [1990, pp. 788-818; 
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969 [1958], pp. 174-190) when studying 
dissociation. In line with Eugène Dupréel (1939) Perelman opposed to the idea that 
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the aim of argumentation should be to remove ambiguity and vagueness in notions:  
 
it is precisely because the notions used in argumentation are not univocal and have 
no fixed meaning that will not change that the conclusions of an argumentation are 
not binding (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969 [1958], p. 132).  
 
Moreover, according to Perelman, the fringe of indefiniteness surrounding notions 
might be useful for two reasons: (1) it might be required to deal with new 
unforeseen uses1; (2) it might be required for reaching agreement in some 
situations2.  
Barack Obama’s dissociation on the notion of “war” in his Nobel Peace Prize 
Speech3 offers a relevant illustration of this technique. Obama opened his speech by 
pointing a practical problem: how could he accept praises for his achievements in 
the pursuit of peace while being “Commander-in-Chief of a nation in the midst of 
two wars”? In order to solve this problem, Obama engaged a semantic work on the 
notion of war the result of which is the valorisation of “just war” as opposed to 
unjustified aggression. Now, it is worth stressing that, in support of his dissociation, 
Obama used well-known rhetorical techniques. He notably used a paradeigma 
(Aristotle, Rhet., I, 2, 1357b): “A non-violent movement could not have halted 
Hitler’s army”, a pragmatic argument (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969 [1958], 
pp. 266-269): “inaction tears at our conscience and can lead to more costly 
intervention later” and a breaking of connecting links (Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca 1969 [1958], pp. 411-415): “no Holy war can ever be a just war”. 
The need for the orator to use various rhetorical resources in support of his 
dissociation reveals a crucial aspect of this technique: although the notion of “just 
war” is the result of a dissociation on the notion of “war”, it is still a “confused 
notion” and, as such, needs to be justified by rhetorical means. And here is the point 
I want to stress on: this observation does not mean that the dissociation failed. On 
the contrary, this reveals that dissociation occurs in the realm of social reality 
(Searle, 1995) where the meaning of notions as important as “war”, “justice” or 
“liberty” is a matter of agreement and conventions (Dupréel, 1948, pp. 25-28). As 
such, it cannot be determined once for all by the identification of a supposedly 
essence of the notion (Popper, 1974 [1963, pp. 97-119). And one could easily 
imagine how reluctant we would be if a legal expert, a philosopher or a head of state 
claimed to have found the true meaning of the notion of “just war” so that it could be 
applied to any new case without deliberation.  
                                                        
1 This view is expressed in the following quote: “to the extent that future experiences and the way in 
which they are to be examined are not entirely foreseeable, it is essential to conceive even the most 
precisely stated terms as surrounded with a fringe of indefiniteness sufficient to enable them to be 
applied to reality. A perfectly clear notion is one of which all cases of application are known so that it 
does not admit a new unforeseen use” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969 [1958], p. 131). 
2 Perelman (1990 [2012, pp. 808-809) famously argued that the agreement on the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights has been possible because the signatories had different interpretations 
of the same notions in mind. 
3  Obama gave this speech on December 10, 2009. The transcript is available here: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize 
VICTOR FERRY 
4 
Therefore, it might be argued that, by dissociating a notion, an arguer will not 
really clarify it, he will rather shape its meaning for the resolution of a particular 
incompatibility. This implies that the agreement on the dissociated notion will not 
only be a matter of semantics: it will also depend on the ability of the arguer to 
successfully justify it for a given audience. As a consequence, I would argue that one 
should take three criteria into account for a successful dissociation: (1) the need to 
solve a practical problem; (2) a work on the meaning of the notion in order to 
remove the incompatibilities; (3) rhetorical skills to justify the dissociation.  
I will now present a different view on dissociation: the normative approach.  
 
3. DISSOCIATION FROM A NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE  
 
With his concept of “persuasive definition”, Stevenson described a feature of 
argumentation that is, at first glance, close to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s 
concept of dissociation. In his 1938 article, Stevenson described persuasive 
definition as a means for an arguer to redirect his audience perception of a notion 
by showing some aspects of it “in a poor light” and some others “in a fine one” (1938, 
p. 332). The main difference is that Stevenson conceived the confusion surrounding 
the notions as potentially dangerous because it offers room for manipulation of the 
audience:  
 
Thanks again to vagueness, the change seemed a “natural” one, which, by escaping 
the attention of the hearers, did not remind them that they were being influenced, 
and so did not stultify them by making them self-conscious (1938, p. 333).  
 
In other words, while Perelman conceived “vagueness” as a condition for 
argumentation, Stevenson saw it as a threat.  
In the same tradition of thinking, Agnes van Rees defined a “sound 
dissociation” as a technique that one should only use “for reasons of greater 
conceptual clarity” and as a means to “generating shared starting-points for 
presenting and attacking arguments, and to ensuring that the conclusions drawn 
from the discussion are optimally precise” (van Rees 2009, p. 121). With this quote, 
it is possible to measure the difference between the normative approach to 
dissociation and the approach I presented in the first part. From van Rees 
perspective, the semantic work on the notion is considered as the only acceptable 
means to reach an agreement: the dissociation has to be made “for reasons of 
greater conceptual clarity”. This implies that rhetoric should be avoided if it is not 
compatible with a research of clarification, conceived as the rational aim of any 
discussion4.  
Even though the difference between the two approaches to dissociation is 
here obvious, one might expect scholars from both perspectives to share a same 
                                                        
4 Here, I would follow Kock (2009) when saying that one better understands the usefulness of 
rhetoric, as defined by Aristotle, if one sees it as a tool for the functioning of institutions (the three 
genres of rhetoric) rather than an analogue to dialectic. In the realm of rhetoric, i.e., the civic sphere, 
ensuring the efficiency of an argumentative technique might be as a rational goal than ensuring its 
soundness.  
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commitment to the need to find ways to ensure rational outcomes to discussions. 
But I would argue that they would have in mind different hierarchies of priorities in 
the virtues an arguer should have to do so. If I go back to the example of “just war”, 
it might be argued that, from a normative perspective, the best way to avoid an 
abusive use of this notion would be to train arguers to differentiate between sound 
and fallacious justifications of this dissociated notion. Indeed, the very aim of the 
pragma-dialectic, the latest development of which is the “strategic maneuvering” 
approach (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999, 2006), is to identify criteria to 
differentiate convincing arguments from merely persuasive ones. From this 
perspective, the ideal arguer should be, at first, rigorous in the application of a 
normative protocol to test arguments. In the perspective of Perelman & Olbrechts-
Tyteca, the best way to avoid manipulation would be to train arguers to keep in 
mind that no notion can be clarified once for all, that is, withdrawn from the domain 
of argumentation. Such arguers should be at first flexible to manage the subtle 
relationship between meaning as inwardness of things and meaning as convention.  
 
4. THE VIRTUES OF DISSOI LOGOI  
 
The reflexion on the method that would best insure a rational outcome to 
discussions often revolves around two figures of arguers: Socrates and the Sophists. 
In his book dedicated to the Presocratics, Karl Popper famously argued:  
 
Critical rationalism is the attitude of the Presocratics. They all emphasized (even 
Parmenides) that we mortals cannot really know, since we can have no certain 
knowledge. This critical rationalism reached its height in Socrates’ method of 
refutation, the elenchus, which Parmenides was most probably the first to use. (1998, 
p. 275)  
 
Socrates’ method of refutation, consisting in questioning someone in order to test 
the soundness of his arguments, inspired the normative approach to argumentation. 
Such a method is, at first glance, a reliable way to avoid dogmatism. But Robert 
Fogelin clearly identified the limit of this method:  
 
If students become convinced that they can always find something wrong with any 
(non-trivial) argument presented to them, then the distinction between good and 
bad arguments is subverted, and the whole enterprise of arguing seems to lose its 
point. (Fogelin, 1985, p. 2) 
 
The rhetorical approach to argumentation tries to overcome this aporia by arguing 
that the ability to be persuaded is as a useful feature of our rationality than the 
ability to look critically at arguments (Danblon, 2002).  
In this respect, and with regard to the bad reputation of the Sophists5 
                                                        
5 This bad reputation is mainly due to Plato’s opposition between skills and virtues. He used this 
opposition as a means to condemn rhetoric. This opposition can notably be found in Plato’s Apology 
in which Socrates begins his speech by explaining that he will only speak the language of truth and, 
therefore, he will not be as eloquent as his accusers. 
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(Tindale, 2010, pp. 9-14), Pearce’s claim on the virtues of dissoi logoi is 
straightforward. Dissoi logoi (or twofold arguments) is an exercise in which a 
student has to argue successively for opposite, and even contradictory views on a 
same issue6. According to Pearce, such an exercise offers the best training for the 
developing of citizenship skills. Here, his point is more pragmatic and realistic than 
philosophical. Indeed, Pearce is concerned with training students to deal with actual 
argumentative situations and not with ideal of critical discussions. A feature of 
actual argumentative situations is “the multiplicity of human perceptions of truth” 
(Pearce, 1994, p. 11). This observation is similar of that of Marc Angenot (2008) 
according to which philosophical and political controversies often ends into a 
dialogue of the deaf: a deep disagreement (Fogelin, 1985) in which arguers cannot 
even agree on a method to solve their disagreement. To face such situations, an 
exercise that trains the arguers to go as far as possible in the defence of a point of 
view they do not share might prove very useful. This is, in my view, Pearce most 
interesting claim:  
 
Unrestricted by the rule of non-contradiction, students are better equipped to 
recognize the merits of an honourable opposition. Such a consideration of multiple 
perceptions is an approach to invention that allows more latitude for adapting 
arguments to situational constraints (Pearce, 1994, p. 6).  
 
As a “thought experiment” (Gera, 2000), dissoi logoi might offer a practical training 
for intellectual empathy. As a practice of argumentation unrestricted by normative 
rules, this exercise also develops the ability to persuade and to be persuaded. And 
this disposition to persuasion might be as an important skill as critical thinking to 
insure that discussions do not end into a dialogue of the deaf.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In my first part, I tried to show that the meaning of a dissociated notion, such as 
“just war” is necessarily the result of an agreement: it not imposed by the 
identification of a supposedly “essence” or “true meaning” of the notion. Such an 
agreement might be described with Searle (1995) famous formula, X counts as Y in 
C, in which X stands for a notion, Y for its meaning as the result of an agreement, and 
C for a given audience to agree on this meaning. As envisaged by Searle, this social 
reality is continuously under two threats: dogmatism (according to which the 
meaning of a notion is not a matter of convention but of essence) and relativism 
(according to which no good reason could ever be given in support of the meaning 
of a notion). Therefore, a useful skill for citizens might be to learn not to choose 
between one of those attitudes, that is, learning to be flexible in order manage the 
                                                        
6 It is worth stressing here on the difference between dissoi logoi and traditional exercises students 
are used to do. Students are usually trained to find reason in support of an opinion. Psychological 
studies show that this kind of exercises reinforce our natural tendency to confirmation bias (Sperber 
& Mercier, 2011). On the contrary, the aim of dissoi logoi is to train what Danblon calls the 
suspension of the judgement (2013, pp. 127-148). It is an experience of change of perspective and a 
training to mind flexibility. 
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subtle relationship between meaning as inwardness of things and meaning as 
convention.  
Following Pearce (1994) I argued that dissoi logoi might be a relevant 
exercise to train such a skill. Indeed, at the precise moment, when we just gave our 
strongest argument in favour of one side of an issue, we reverse our perspective and 
try to represent the opposite side of it, we can experience what Danblon (2013, pp. 
127-148) calls the suspension of the judgement. This regular practice might 
accustom the arguers to a more flexible relation between critical thinking, as a 
means to avoid dogmatism, and persuasion, as a means to reach agreements.  
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